EVOLUTIONARY FEMINIST THEORY

Theory & Science (2007) : ISSN: 1527-5558

EVOLUTIONARY FEMINIST THEORY
Female Intrasexual Competition: Toward an Evolutionary Feminist Theory 

Ingo, K.M., Colorado State University-Pueblo
Mize, K.D., Florida Atlantic University
Pratarelli, M.E., Colorado State University-Pueblo

Abstract 
Female intrasexual competition is perceived as a hindrance to feminist goals of equality. This paper argues a modern feminist theory could be consistent with natural selection. The social science feminist framework believes female competition is fostered by a patriarchal power structure benefiting from a division amongst women. Feminists argue that environment plays far greater roles in shaping people than does biology, and thus cultural reform will alleviate this competition. It is an implicit assumption of the hunter-gatherer model that survival is a cooperative venture between partners. Thus, women competing over high status mates and men over a woman’s mate value are simply functional coevolved strategies; they do not impose a value-laden hierarchy. Nature may give the appearance of inequality and injustice between the sexes. However, a cognitively complex brain-mind could reconcile the meaning of coevolved strategies and educate individuals past their perceived ills toward more equitable outcomes with an evolutionary feminist theory. 

Female Intrasexual Competition: Toward an Evolutionary Feminist Theory 
Competition for resources is the foundation of evolutionary theory. It is the force that drives a species to survive ( Darwin, 1859). To compete with others is to behave aggressively, be it directly or indirectly. Direct aggression is most commonly associated with males and indirect aggression with females, although either sex is capable of both types. From an evolutionary standpoint, these strategies were the most compatible with solving problems faced in an early hunter-gatherer environment (in which the human mind evolved) rather than modern social environments and in fact, may be detrimental in modern times (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). That is, the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) is most like that described by anthropologists for hunter-gatherer communities. Males evolved into a directly aggressive role to defend against predators and other males. Females evolved to aggress in ways that ensured them the least amount of physical danger when competing for food and superior mates, while also developing the capacity for direct aggression when protecting their offspring. The EEA is an important consideration in evolutionary psychology because it establishes a context for assessing the efficacy of putative preexisting adaptations in later (current) or future environments. That is, what may have been a successful adaptation to existing environmental pressures in the EEA, may no longer serve their primary purpose or may in fact become counterproductive in a changed environment. In view of tremendous changes in modernity vis-à-vis the EEA, the question of intrasexual competition (for both women as well as men) demands that the behavioral sciences make its best effort to reconcile the two. Nonetheless, because male aggression is so visible and has attracted much attention from social scientists, female aggression and its implications have received comparatively little attention even within feminist theory. 

The Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) contends that aggressive behavior is the result of socialization (Buss, 1999). Essentially, it suggests males are rewarded for aggression while females are discouraged from it. As a result, males tend to be aggressive and females cooperative. It is important to note that while the SSSM does not characterize exactly all the varieties of contemporary feminist perspectives, it continues to capture the essential elements of those that subscribe to the postmodern constructivist paradigm. Vandermassen’s (2005) recent work on this subject dissects the various and most prominent feminist perspectives and identifies those elements in each that allows readers to assess to what degree they fit the classical SSSM. One consistent theme is the almost conspicuous absence of the issue of competition between females. When it is addressed, it is explained as the result of a patriarchal power structure constructed and maintained by men to keep women divided and oppressed. As Wolf (2002) suggests, “Competition between women has been made part of the myth that women will be divided from one another” (p. 14). The purported “myth” is simply an example of the modern denial of a biological human nature (Pinker, 2002; Pratarelli & Mize, 2002), which some fear reduces humans to a collection of animalistic drives. This argument has ancient roots and saw its greatest popularity at the time Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species. This is because of the denialists’ refusal to accept a biological link between humans and nonhumans; not surprisingly, the latter are perceived as lower in kind. Postmodern feminist theory, in particular, exhibits this class of historical reconstruction that fits a political or religious set of presumptions and rejects any hint of biological determinism (McGettigan, 2000). 

By attributing their oppression to solely environmental causes, women are sabotaging their own success as well as feminist goals of equality. Their solutions to their subjugated status are reformation and reconstruction of the current system. They suggest that raising children as androgynous, resisting the media images of what a woman should be, and activism within the political sphere will ultimately lead to equality. While these are all valid suggestions, they do not attempt to understand the root of the problem. The media does bombard women with unrealistic images; children are encouraged to behave in ways considered consistent with their sex; and women do compete with each other in damaging ways yet, focusing on the cultural representations of biological motivations does little to effect change. The position taken in this article is that by understanding why the biological motivations exist and how they combine with environmental factors to generate and shape cultural norms may very well be the first step toward change. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which women have evolved to compete with each other and how understanding this competition could translate into a more rational and efficacious feminist theory. 

Evidence from Human Evolutionary Psychology 
Contemporary feminists have objected to evolutionary psychology for a number of important reasons worthy of explanation and clarification. They have accused the field of considering everything an adaptation, presenting “just so” stories as fact, and supporting the sociopolitical status quo, etc., ( Campbell, 2002). Regrettably, as Vandermassen (2005), McGettigan, (2000), Pratarelli (in press) and others have intimated, these accusations stem partially from a resistance to examine the state-of-the-art literature and understand its concepts. To be considered a psychological adaptation by the mainstream academic human evolutionary psychology community, a behavior must be documented in at least three different and important ways (Buss, 1999). The behavior in question must be examined (1) historically across extended periods of time, (2) it must be observed in multiple cultural contexts that allow experts to continue testing the hypothesis that the behavior is culturally universal, and (3) it must be seen in at least one other nonhuman species such that it increases fitness and reproductive success (Schmitt & Pilcher, 2004). In keeping with this methodological standard, this article will briefly examine each in later sections. 

A final consideration involves examining at least some of the most frequent or popular issues raised by the detractors of evolutionary explanations in general, and for intrasexual female competition in particular. The “just so” stories accusation is leveled by detractors (cf., Rose, H., & Rose, S. (2000); Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000) who may not have had the opportunity yet to fully consider the theoretical and methodological details of the “new science of the mind” (Buss, 1999). Campbell (2002) captures the essential properties of evolutionary models by saying, 
…evolutionary psychology proceeds by (1) identifying an adaptive problem that proto- humans would have faced in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, (2) developing a description of the module that is suggested to have evolved in response to this problem, including the range of inputs that would have activated it and the impact of its outputs in terms of differential survival and reproductive success, (3) formulating a description of the current environment and a map of correspondence between the ancestral and present conditions that allows specific hypotheses to be generated about the current activating inputs, and (4) undertaking tests of these hypotheses which, where appropriate, allow comparison with alternative (evolutionary or non-evolutionary) accounts. (p.24) 

Evolutionary psychology is not based on speculation; it is backed by sound evidence utilizing the scientific method (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). It also does not purport that what is natural is necessarily morally right. It does not try nor intend to support and legitimize the sociopolitical status quo. Seeking to understand the biological motivations that underlie certain human behaviors is an attempt to explain the possible origins of these behaviors, not justify them. Many feminists in fact recognize and accept biological predispositions as partial explanations of behavior. This can be inferred by their acceptance in their reactions to the notion of biological predeterminism, which Vandermassen (2005) has termed, “biophobia within feminism” (p. 85). However, the belief that all things natural and biological are therefore right, correct, and good is a product of a heuristic reasoning process called the naturalistic fallacy (Landeweerd, 2004). Feminist scholars who have unknowingly applied the naturalistic fallacy simply misunderstand the implications of biological explanations of behavior. They assume that what is natural is being justified as morally right, good, and thus legitimized. However, these are moral judgments that lack both a theoretical and scientific basis. Infanticide in primate species is a natural occurrence but it is doubtful that a rationalist would consider it right or good, it just is. The flaw in reasoning occurs when one mistakes what is for what we believe ought to be. Kant and Hume both addressed the is versus what ought to be dichotomy philosophically, but Pratarelli (2003) has recently integrated it with the human evolutionary psychology theoretical framework.

Proponents of the SSSM types of feminist models, which still enjoy considerable popularity in nonacademic communities and some proponents even within academic circles, functionally ignore the role of innate drives in the production of behavior and culture, focusing instead only on the effects of environmental triggers assuming that they entirely cause the response. This is the expected position from the social learning theory perspective, which dates back some 40 years (Bandura, 1977), well before both cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology revolutionized psychology’s understanding about the origins of human behavior, including social behavior. Therefore, consistent responses to an environmental demand by a species indicates that “the pattern of response is part of the species’ nature” (Gaulin & McBurney, 2004, p. 4). If the environment is to trigger a response, organisms require an inherited psychological processor to respond in a species-typical manner because “responses are impossible without rules of responding” (p.5). While the more progressive proponents of the SSSM-type perspectives acknowledge that “some traits result from experience and some result from genes,” it is impossible to determine which portion of any given trait can be attributed either to nature or to nurture (p.6). Social scientists argue that the environment shapes traits based upon the limits set by genes. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists contend that this is a mistake. They argue there is compelling evidence that there are inborn rules that delimit an organism’s response to variations in the environment. These “facultative traits” are what were naturally selected for resulting in the interaction of nature and nurture for any given trait (p.8).

Why and How Women Compete 
Both men and women compete intrasexually to obtain a superior mate. Biologically, the purpose of selecting a superior mate is to enhance the likelihood of producing the most viable offspring. What is considered superior varies according to sex and the mating strategy employed (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Men are statistically more likely than women to pursue a short-term strategy, i.e., they have the capacity and drive to attempt to fertilize as many women as possible with as little commitment or investment as possible. Despite this difference, long-term strategies are common to both sexes. According to Sexual Strategies Theory, “[m] en prefer as long term mates women who are young and physically attractive as indicators of [health and] reproductive value and who are sexually loyal and likely to be faithful as indicators of paternity certainty” while, “[w] omen in long-term contexts…place great value on a man’s ambition, earning capacity, and professional degrees” (Buss & Schmitt, 1993, p. 226). 

To understand why female intrasexual competition is a beneficial adaptation in mate selection, one must first understand the adaptive nature of the sexual division of labor in the EEA. Anthropology tells us males hunted for meat and protected the group from predation so that females were safe to gather food while bearing and raising children who would ensure the future survival of the species. While this characterization might not appeal to a majority of contemporary feminists who would prefer a more equal division of labor, it is important to note that these behaviors coevolved as a function of survival. If an adaptation increases a species’ ability to survive and reproduce, it is passed on to future generations. Because the sexual division of labor practiced by early humans met those criteria, it has perpetuated itself through the genes that express those traits in the X and Y-chromosomes. Female intrasexual competition was a necessity in an environment where survival depended on superior mate selection that led to increased food acquisition for females whose parental investment was far greater than that of males’. Despite the modern human environment, it continues today, on an unconscious instinctual level (Pinker, 2002; Pratarelli, 2003). These motivational instruction sets exist as brain circuits passed on generation-to-generation, much like the ability to breathe or the capacity to acquire symbolic language is passed on one generation to the next.

In order to acquire superior mates while maintaining the highest degree of personal safety, females evolved an indirect way of aggressing toward one another. “One way women can compete without risking their safety or compromising their lives is through acts that ostracise, stigmatise, and otherwise exclude others [female competitors] from social interaction” (Campbell, 2004, p. 3). Gossip and backstabbing are two common acts practiced by women to effectively eliminate a rival. By casting doubt on the fidelity of rivals, women are able to increase their own chances of acquiring what they believe is a superior long-term mate (Vandermassen, 2005). Prior intimate knowledge of one’s competitor also serves to validate the claims one makes against a rival. 

Common forms of spreading gossip and backstabbing are seen in the emergent behaviors of high-school age adolescent females, although they have been reported in girls as young as 8 years old (Bjorkqvist, Lagerspetz, & Kaukiainen, 1992). The combination of higher levels of maturity and larger social networks allow females to refine their technique over time resulting in more covert and less personally damaging behaviors (Bjorkqvist et al., 1992; Campbell, 2002). Gossip, exclusion, and dirty looks were the three most frequently reported forms of indirect aggression in a self-report study of 15-16 year-old girls conducted by James and Owens (2005). Utilization of these forms of indirect aggression have been found to continue into adulthood (Bjorkqvist, Osterman, & Lagerspetz, 1994). 

Another way that women compete is through physical appearance. Henderson and Anglin (2003) found that women whose facial features men rate as most attractive are also the women with longer life spans. The causal connection may be that pleasant facial features are an indicator of good health. The same causal association is applied universally to selecting unblemished fruits, vegetables, meats, etc., because they are less likely to cause sickness. The longer a woman lives, the more likely she is to be able to continue to care for future generations that carry on the genetic composition of she and her mate. The use of cosmetics as well as face or brow lifts, microdermabrasion, and other anti-aging creams and masks are ways in which a woman can project an enhanced facial appearance, thereby increasing her chances of being viewed as a superior mate. Moreover, since youth is also valued as a sign of reproductive fitness, women can be naturally expected to exhibit a degree of malediction and avoidance or denial of aging. Body shape, as measured by waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), is yet another way in which men evaluate a woman’s mating potential. Buunk and Dijkstra (2005) have in fact argued that, “a low WHR signals health and fertility” (p. 380). Tummy tucks, liposuction, and specialized contour enhancing undergarments are used to project a lower WHR. By presenting the physical attributes considered appealing to the majority of the opposite sex, females are able to enjoy a greater amount of selectivity and attention in mate selection. 

Feminist theory refutes the use of attractiveness by women to compete for mates by citing variations in beauty standards dependent on culture. While definitions of beauty indeed vary by region, the biological motivations that underlie the drive to achieve it in fact meet the criteria of universality. Similarly, in countries where food is abundant, a more slender body may be more appealing because it signifies health, whereas in countries where food is scarce, a more ample body shape is more appealing because it signifies access to resources (Vandermassen, 2005). At their core, cultural differences are just different manifestations of identical biological imperatives necessary for the survival of the species. This is essentially what was meant by Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow (1992) when they proposed that our biology is what makes culture possible in the first place. 

A conspiratorial media and advertising is another way in which feminist theory attempts to cast doubt on an evolutionary explanation of women’s competition via physical appearance. In American media where youth and beauty are valued seemingly above all else, feminism views the pressure as too great and as a result women feel pressured to conform in order to succeed. Feminists attribute the targeting of women’s appearance by advertisers as a profitable way to keep women preoccupied with issues other than equality (Wolf, 2002). Advertising, however, is a supply and demand industry. The increased numbers of beauty products ranging from cosmetics to anti-aging creams are simply a natural reaction of the industry to the increased demands of consumers. Women seek these products in order to become more competitive with one another. Feminists would undoubtedly counter with the assertion that the demand is created by the media’s representation of the ideal woman, not a biological imperative to compete. Although these social factors surely play a role, they do not explain the historical and cross-cultural (i.e., cultural universality) evidence for aggression and competition that can not possibly be the result of advertising (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). Furthermore, Buss and Duntley suggest, “This ignores a plausible suggestion that media messages are products of women’s and men’s evolved psychology that merely exploit the existing mechanisms of media consumers rather than create them” (Campbell, 1999, p.219). As before, cultural variations do not preclude biological drives, they express them. 

Cross Species Evidence 
One of the criteria used in evolutionary psychology to determine whether a behavior is an adaptation is its observation comparatively across other species. Non-human primates are the most commonly utilized due to their genetic proximity to humans. Through the use of field and laboratory studies, researchers have confirmed that female intrasexual competition through indirect aggression occurs in many primate species. In a study conducted in the laboratory using common female marmosets, Saltzman, Schultz-Darken, and Abbott (1996) found that female aggression aimed at another unknown female predicts dominance. This is also especially important among marmosets, a species in which only the dominant female ovulates. As the only ovulating female, the dominant marmoset is able to breed with males assured of paternity. Her offspring are also guaranteed to be cared for not only by herself but by the subordinate females as well. 

In her naturalistic observations of tufted capuchin monkeys, Izar (2003) found that competition between females was highly dependent on the availability of food. Of the aggressive acts observed, “…70% of the episodes were disputes for food and 30% protection of dependent offspring” (p. 83). Due to the limited food resources in the observed monkeys’ habitat, competition for food rather than competition for superior mates appeared to drive the observed intrasexual competition. But the competitive drive exists nonetheless. 

Vervaecke, Stevens, and Van Elsacker (2003) observed captive dominant female bonobos increasing their reproductive success at the expense of subordinate females. By interfering with the ovulations and copulations of the lesser-ranked females, dominants were able to mediate their relative reproductive success. These same females were also viewed harassing and killing the infants of lower ranked, unrelated females thereby securing larger amounts of resources for their own young. 

Evidence for Cultural Universality 
Another important criterion used to determine whether a behavior is an adaptation is its observation across cultures. If a particular behavior or class of behaviors is observed in all cultures, especially in those that may have had no direct contacts where cultural exchange was possible in recorded history, then the motivators must exist as part of the human genotype. This is an area teeming with research opportunities as it is often assumed that second-class status among women exists universally. Few formal studies have been conducted in the United States regarding female competition let alone in other countries. The evidence, however, can be gleaned by surveying countless sociology, psychology and cultural anthropology studies that intimate women compete for mates in the varieties of ways discussed earlier. Yet, the researchers who have explored this area have returned promising results. 

Through the use of ethnographic interviews, surveys, and naturalistic observation, 
Hines and Fry (1994) found that women in Buenos Aires, Argentina also employ more indirect forms of aggression than men. Their use of, “fashion, sex appeal, make-up, [and] hairstyles” to compete with one another are consistent with the strategies employed by women in the United States (p.232). It was also noted that the women of Buenos Aires were very socially aware. It was hypothesized that this increased social awareness may have improved their abilities to compete indirectly through various social networks. If a woman wanted to destroy a rival’s reputation, she need only determine where in the social network she could obtain possibly damaging information. This use of social awareness by women to compete has not yet been fully explored. A recent study of the Tsimane women of Bolivia (Rucas et al., 2006) extends the cross-cultural evidence concerning the use of indirect aggression by women. Further research in this area might reveal other aspects of indirect aggression. While the little research that has been conducted seems to point to the same forms of female competition within other cultures; more research is needed to confirm these results. 

Toward an Evolutionary Feminist Theory 
Through the course of human existence, males and females have co-evolved strategies that increase reproductive success. One of these adaptations is the use of aggression. Because of their increased parental investment, females have evolved to compete with one another using indirect means. These have been documented across-species and the several cultures that have been studied to date. While this strategy has benefited women in many ways, it is still viewed as problematic within feminist theory for the reasons addressed earlier regarding our current understanding of the role of biological predispositions. The denial of possible biological origins of female intrasexual competition thus hinders the ideals of the feminist movement. The tendency of some feminists explanations to attribute the problems within the movement to a patriarchal society is an ineffective way of establishing or justifying equality. Moreover, placing women in the role of victim effectively hinders their ability to effect change and disempowers them. 

Instead, identifying the motivations and predispositions that compel women to compete with other women does not diminish feminism in any way. It does not make or support the assertion that women are, by nature, inferior and powerless to change the current power structure. Contrary to Kimmel’s (2000) fatalistic view that acceptance and understanding of biological origins implies that, “…no amount of political initiative, no amount of social spending, no great policy upheavals will change the relationships between men and women” (p. 22), the progress made by the feminists in the past is evidence that some degree of change is indeed possible. The important question is whether, in general, the postmodern feminist framework is counterproductive because it obviates women’s biological nature. 

Evolutionary theory represents a sound logical and cohesive paradigm wherein the contributions of both sexes are necessary for survival. In modernity, there is little doubt that males are just as capable as females of taking care of children, and females are just as capable as men of providing for a family. As we stated earlier, nature is indifferent to human moral concerns. As long as a species adopts behaviors that increase fitness and reproductive success it does not matter which sex takes which role. If feminists were to look beyond culture to the possible underlying biological motivations that produce them, women would be able to deconstruct the roots of their oppression. By examining our past, feminists can understand the roles that men, society, and themselves have played and continue to play in the competition game. Further examination of these roles can lead to theories and practices that are more likely to result in the further success of the noble feminist goals. As evolutionary biology did for the biological sciences and medicine, a biopsychosocial model, or rather, an evolutionary feminist theory would provide a comprehensive and cohesive interactionist framework for examining female intrasexual competition that, to this point, appears to have hindered reaching the goal of gender parity. 

The work of Chesler (2003) is the beginning of an understanding within feminism of the biological motivations that drive females to compete with one another. In her book, Woman’s Inhumanity to Woman, Chesler cites the extensive research within psychology and anthropology that points to the biological causes of indirect aggression between women. She also provides a possible solution to the problems these adaptations cause within the feminist agenda. She suggests that if women are informed of these drives—thereby understanding the context within which they exist—then they will be better able to cope with the urges they produce. She suggests that women take a hard look at their belief systems and realize that while they are part of the solution to inequality, they are also part of its cause. 

Conclusion 
Research has provided compelling evidence for the development and adaptive nature of female intrasexual competition. The use of indirect aggression by women to compete with other women for superior mate selection, which is tied to food acquisition and parental investment, is both beneficial and damaging. While it increases the survival of the species, it also has the capacity to create inequities between the actors who share common species-specific interests. Some of these inequalities between the sexes have been the focus of the feminist movement for many years as it attempts to encourage sociopolitical changes to nurture gender parity. As Vandermassen and others have shown in other areas that concern feminists, the present paper examines the biological bases for intrasexual female competition in order to frame it in a scientifically objective and testable manner. It is our contention that a clear and complete non-constructivist accounting of the innate predispositions that manifest themselves in both individual and institutionalized behavior patterns—as is the case with female intrasexual competition—is a far more rational method of study. Moreover, it is necessary precondition for developing and implementing intervention programs that stand a chance of succeeding where others have struggled in the past. 

The strength and efficacy of women’s biological predisposition to engage in competition over mate selection and its implications cannot be ignored because they both contribute and are part of the patriarchal system evolved in many primates, and especially in the human species. Keeping always in mind that the trap of the naturalistic fallacy threatens to derail theory development, experts need to regularly reexamine their arguments as well as their motives for promoting certain perspectives or political agendas to the exclusion of others. Thus, when we examine behavior patterns such as gossiping, backstabbing, and a focus on physical appearance as characteristics of female intrasexual competition, it is important to keep in mind that raising the biological/innateness argument in no way legitimizes the inequities that they inherently create under normal environmental circumstances. Doing so only serves to perpetuate the patriarchal society that men and women have shared in creating, but for which most agree needs to be adapted to eliminate the conspicuous inequalities apparent in modernity. Although beyond the scope of this paper, future work should continue to focus on reviewing more thoroughly both the strengths and weaknesses of both evolutionary psychology and feminism, how the two may serve to complement each other, and developing a framework for the two to work together toward a modern evolutionary feminist theory. Generating such a theory could provide a starting point from which feminists could (1) begin to understand the biological motivations that drive all cultures to treat women as second-class citizens, and (2) develop a strategic plan to address change more effectively through education aimed at providing women with the tools to recognize and effectively combat the indirect aggression of their female counterparts. After all, there is little dispute today that the single most important variable that impacts such pervasive social ills as poverty, rapid population growth, health and malnutrition (by reducing them) is the education of women (United Nations, 2002). International research in population demographics has shown that education of women always results in a reduction in family size and the improvement in living conditions as women begin to take greater control of their body, their access to resources, and their social climate in general. Given the importance of female intrasexual competition in women’s lives, education that represents it in its proper light in terms of its natural selectivity is one important step toward realizing a new modern feminist theory. 

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions…Intentionality, the Growth of Knowledge, and Cultural Evolution

Theory & Science (2007) : ISSN: 1527-5558

Decisions, Decisions, Decisions…Intentionality, the Growth of Knowledge, and Cultural Evolution: Establishing Evolutionary Reasoning in the Social Sciences

Jon VanWieren, Western Michigan University 

Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to work toward developing evolutionary reasoning in the social sciences. There are reasons for being critical of bland evolutionary metaphors and simplistic applications of neo-Darwinian methods and conceptual tools to the study of human culture and society. I believe, however, that the arguments on the other side of these criticisms are stronger. There is sufficient grounds and evidence supporting some of the insights from evolutionary epistemology regarding the growth of knowledge. Here I focus on the role of intentionality and cumulative knowledge in driving cultural evolution, as well as some of the implications of a co-evolutionary understanding of human biology and culture. I present this case to the social sciences, particularly areas of science and technology studies, making the argument that the approach of deconstructionism and/or metaphysical constructivism, typical of the field, is incapable of dealing with the realties of the natural world and some of the radical implications of new knowledge across the life sciences. I argue here for a re-naturalized understanding of human beings, culture, and society. 


1. INTRODUCTION 
The social sciences lack a shared theoretical foundation. Today there still seems to be some confusion over the mission and purpose of the social sciences. Are they even sciences, or something closer to arts? Should their goal be to interpret, quantify, liberate, or evaluate? For many, the answer is likely: all of the above. 

Things did not start this way, however, at least not for sociology. Auguste Comte envisioned sociology to be the last science, a science that would incorporate relevant knowledge and findings from across the sciences into a unified whole. It would seem that today this view of sociology, and the social sciences more generally, is not widely shared. Specialization and compartmentalization seem closer to the norm. C.P. Snow’s portrait of the academic world had it split between the sciences and the humanities, with rarely these two seeing eye-to-eye. More recently, there has been the controversy surrounding the “science wars” and the sociobiology uproar. Ullica Segerstråle has documented both of these controversies superbly (2000a, b). Segerstråle’s surveys bring light to the real and continuing debate over the nature of science and its social aspects. 

Here I would like to explore some of these matters. My primary purpose here is to contribute to an argument for evolutionary reasoning in social science. This argument has been around for a while in different forms. When thinking about the earlier forms of evolutionary thought in social science, we often remember Spencer, and the pro and anti phases of evolutionism in anthropology and sociology generally. The thinking and argument here, however, shares little with the more or less transformational evolutionary theories of the past (see Reisman, 2005). Along with a number of others working in this area, those who recognize the variational character of a properly Darwinian theory of evolution, I believe that a theoretical program centered on evolutionary reasoning has much to offer the social sciences through a broadening of our understanding of behavior and culture. 

Here I will be considering three aspects of the evolutionary argument as directed toward the social sciences. There are a few basic premises I’ll be working with here that are already rather well established, while their implications have gone largely unrealized. Taken together, they offer a convincing case for the establishment of a theoretical groundwork based on naturalized realism.

The three aspects of the argument I’ll focus on are these: 1) First, human knowledge has accumulated over history. We can understand the growth of knowledge as both neurobiological and cultural. In fact, it is helpful to understand both of these in order to get at the larger picture. The gist of this first aspect of the argument stems from ideas associated with evolutionary epistemology, as developed by Karl Popper and Donald T. Campbell. Recent neurobiological research supports the basic thrust of evolutionary epistemology (see Edelman, 2006; Wexler, 2006). 2) Second, human beings are conscious intentional agents. Often, this fact is taken to mean that human behavior and decisions stand outside the natural world and are therefore not subject to “natural” understandings. I will argue against this commonly held notion. Here also, intentionality will be shown to be at the basis of the growth of knowledge, and at the foundation of culture. 3) Third, increased knowledge and information lead to social and cultural change. Understanding how knowledge and information accumulate helps to show how culture evolves according to mechanisms of variation and selection, largely based on human decisions (and human minds), but also on hidden-hand mechanisms (see Sterelny, 2006). The driving force of variation within culture is new information and innovation; this is true across the areas of beliefs, ideas, science and technology. Furthermore, if our goal is indeed to better understand culture and human behavior, recognizing the biological basis of culture will allow us to better understand the co-evolutionary process of biological and cultural evolution, existing in tandem. My efforts here are directed toward some of the basic elements of our aptitude toward culture, this in an effort to establish a groundwork for understanding its more developed forms through language, symbols, values, norms, and beliefs. 

2. KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATES: EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY OR KUHNIAN REVOLUTIONS? 
It is always a good idea to remind ourselves of the facts, to remind ourselves of what we actually know. 

-John R. Searle.

2.1 Cumulative Knowledge 
Do we know more today than we did in the past- more than we did twenty thousand, two thousand, or twenty years ago? I would guess that many of us would say yes. Others might not be quite as willing to support this matter-of-fact common-sense conjecture. If it is not true, what might be our reasons for rejecting this claim?

It is not entirely uncommon to hear lectures on this topic and a version of Thomas Kuhn’s thesis of scientific revolutions (sometimes in social science departments). According to some, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) reveals the history of science as a series of irreconcilable “paradigm shifts.” Supporters of this thesis maintain that it is a liberating lesson for all of us in that it shows that no single paradigm of knowledge holds any greater or ultimate hold on truth or reality over any other. This, however, would be an extreme interpretation of Kuhn’s thesis.

Taking the basic thrust of Kuhn’s argument seriously, there is little doubt that knowledge has undergone change over history. Are we to take this to mean that science is somehow a sham? There is debate on whether or not Kuhn’s argument was meant as a wholesale criticism of science itself or a criticism of science from within- one that does not jeopardize scientific practice itself. 

The Kuhnian debate rages on between scientists, philosophers, and within the social sciences and humanities. Some critics of science inspired by Kuhn have abandoned philosophical and evidential arguments altogether in favor of criticisms based on purely social grounds. In some circles the scientific enterprise itself has come under fire as an expression of power, cultural elitism, Western imperialism, male domination, and the privileging of certain political and value-interests. It is perhaps interesting that some of the most fiercely “deconstructionist” narratives of this sort come from within Science and Technology Studies (STS). Robert Merton’s brand of sociology of science has long been replaced by the spirit of Barnes and Bloor’s “strong program in the sociology of scientific knowledge”, incommensurability, and an emphasis political and social interests. The general grounds of argument from critiques of science such as these is that knowledge is shaped by its social context, held captive there within local practices, norms and conventions. For example, Latour and Woolgar emphasized the “actor-network” theory, a theory that scientific work and practice itself drives claims on truth, nature, and facts (see Godfrey-Smith 2003). “Feminist epistemology” goes further, claiming that science is political, a male dominated field serving male institutions of knowledge. The field is characterized by Sismondo (2004) as one that takes a variety of anti-essentialist positions. Radical skeptics hold that no scientific method is capable of translating nature into knowledge. The prime impetus of the field seems to be the pursuit of showing how scientific knowledge is socially constructed, not discovered. Some of these arguments are serious and plausible. Sometimes, authors working in this vein draw upon the works of respectable philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Rorty, Feyerabend, and occasionally the classical skeptical arguments of Hume, Berkeley and Kant (take your pick on the “respectable” ones) in support of what might generally be characterized as relativist, anti-universal, and anti-knowledge approaches to science. What makes some of these positions even more peculiar today, in their most radical form, is the overwhelming success of science and technology in recent times. While such success does not always betoken truth (Kitcher 2001), such success does force us to recognize the power of new discoveries within the sciences to reorganize social life, at the very least.

This state of affairs, evidenced through the science wars and the sociobiology debate, has led some of the more common-sense persuasion to object that STS has abandoned its original mission, as Ziman has (2000a). It has left others to ask if there might be something more unconscious at work with certain domains of the social sciences, such as a Fear of Knowledge (Boghossian, 2006). 

While a simple scientific realism invites jeers (Kitcher 2001), and a healthy does of skepticism is of course a necessary element in science and philosophy, my argument here is that the anti-realist position stands on shaky, fragmenting ground. The positions of “metaphysical constructivism” and/or “ontological nihilism” disregard the evidential grounds upon which the sciences are based, supplanting social grounds at every turn. All of this leaves many within STS and some within the social sciences in support of a position that denies the obvious while turning from reality. 

While these examples may be seen as the polar ends of the scientist-humanist spectrum, in part they represent the divergence of views held within the social sciences. It remains the case that social sciences lack an agreed upon theoretical grounding, and more fundamentally a basic agreement on what stands for knowledge. This seems so across the various quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches. Along with the recognition of multiple truths, we have recognized the need for different criteria of validation. In response, a host of theoretical positions and standpoints have been called upon in defense of ones chosen criteria, or lack of criteria, for validation.

We might trace these developments, in part, back to the anti-Enlightenment response of Vico (1668-1744), this through Edelman (2006) and historian Isaiah Berlin. Vico dampened the spirit of the Enlightenment by contesting that human beings make their own history, and should understand themselves in a way that is different from how they understand external nature. Dilthey (1833-1911) too argued that the study of human beings requires a separate logic. He proposed that disciplines be separated into Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) and Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences). Dilthey’s hermeneutics holds that human behavior requires interpretation within a historical culture, and that human beings are creatures that will, feel, and think (Edelman, 2006).

With this, we come to the root of the matter. Does human consciousness and free will remove human beings from naturalized understandings? Simply, is human behavior and human culture off limits to theories and methods from natural science? 

In addressing this question, I will later argue that we make an effort to re-think culture. This re-thinking will be one that takes stock of what we know about evolutionary science, human origins, and our brains. Before re-thinking culture, we might first think a bit more about knowledge, and the evolutionary approach to knowledge as developed by Karl Popper and Donald T. Campbell. 

2.2 Incommensurable Paradigms? 
The problem with Kuhn’s thesis on paradigm shifts in science is that they do not occur, at least not in their extreme version- the version most often touted by critics of science. We might start with the glaring fact that Kuhn was not entirely clear when he discussed “paradigm shifts”- which some have pointed out is a term he uses in at least twenty different ways (Mayr, 2004). Also, there is no clear-cut way to distinguish revolutions from “normal science.” Normal science includes a gradation between minor and major theory changes, that is, theory change is part of normal science. Furthermore, as Ernst Mayr points out, Kuhn made no distinction between theory change caused by discoveries and theory changed caused by the development of new concepts, entailing different implications. New discoveries that fit within an established theoretical framework may not have as significant an impact as new conceptualizations. 

On incommensurability, Kuhn has been read as implying that when a new discovery or theory is developed, the old one is replaced. Godfrey-Smith has suggested that in this respect Kuhn was too focused on the case of theoretical physics (2003). In reality, this is far from the case across scientific practice. As Mayr summarizes:
The picture of theory change that Kuhn painted in 1962 was congenial to the essentialist thinking of physicalists. However, it is incompatible with the gradualist thinking of a Darwinian. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Darwinian epistemologists introduced an entirely different conceptualization for theory change in biology, usually referred to as evolutionary epistemology (Mayr, 2004: 167). 

We should not forget that evolutionary ideas had been floating around well before Darwin, and that Darwin’s fundamental contribution was his conceptualization of population thinking and natural selection, concepts supported through his field research. Another point here is that when new discoveries are made or new concepts developed, the earlier knowledge does not simply evaporate into non-existence. It sticks around, in at least one of two ways. If the knowledge is not already a fundamental prerequisite to the new discoveries or theories, which is often the case, then the remaining theories compete based on their ability to correspond with the best of what we know of the external world at the time. 

2.3 Evolutionary Epistemology 
The fact that theories compete, in everyday knowledge and science, is a central aspect of evolutionary epistemology. Here we might identify two aspects of the evolutionary epistemology project. The first is that: 
An evolutionary epistemology would be at minimum an epistemology taking cognizance of and compatible with man’s status as a product of biological and social evolution (Campbell, 1988: 393).

We, the rational among us, know that human beings are a product of biological evolution, but do we take this (rather solid) evidence seriously enough? We are aware of some of the implications here. Over the years our brains have changed, seemingly for the better, with an enlarging of our cognitive capacity (Mayr, 2001). When exactly the major jump in knowledge occurred is a question for us all, and especially for the record of human origins. 

Neurobiologist Gerald M. Edelman (2006) offers an insightful assessment of brain science and the development of human knowledge. His project starts with what he and others have called “Neural Darwinism.” But if we were to associate Edelman with the “sociobiologists”, as the initial impulse might be, we would be mistaken. Edelman rejects severe reductionism, just as he rejects the primary alternative, Cartesian mind-body dualism. Edelman recalls that is was Ren é Descartes who helped to remove the mind from nature by extracting the mind from the body. Edelman is confident that discoveries about the brain in the past twenty years free us from the body-mind predicament, as well as the trappings of phenomenal subjectivity. Edelman’s science supports an extension of Willard Van Orman Quine’s naturalized epistemology.

In regards to naturalism, Karl Popper too worked in this general direction, holding that there is a connection between natural selection and the emergence of mind (1978). Still, this aspect of Popper’s project has yet to make as serious an impact as it warrants within the social sciences. For the most part, such efforts are still received with hostility and taken as a form of biological reductionism. This seems somewhat peculiar today, given that evolution is a theoretical-scientific framework that most of us accept when it comes to butterflies and finches. But evolution, the argument here is, is also a knowledge process, especially for human beings, as Popper and Campbell have shown ( Campbell, 1988). Popper’s primary contribution to evolutionary epistemology was to recognize that scientific theories go through a selective elimination process. Theories about the world must be tested, and therefore can also be falsified (but not entirely proven according to Popper, who gives full attention to Hume’s problem of induction). 

The history of basic knowledge growth can also be seen as a process of selection and elimination (or retention). Popper’s ideas about conjecture and refutation can well be applied to the trial and error learning of early human beings, whose conjectures about the world around them (I believethat if I eatthis mushroom it might kill me) had a clear survival value. Also, learning and perception are essential aspects of the knowledge process. 
The method of learning by trial and error- of learning from our mistakes- seems to be fundamentally the same whether it is practiced by lower or by higher animals, by chimpanzees or by men of science (Popper; Campbell, 1988: 398). 

For Popper a central problem of all epistemology is the growth of knowledge, the expansions and breakouts from the limits of prior wisdom ( Campbell, 1988). According to Kuhn, and an extreme reading of his thesis, when new knowledge is gained it is a paradigm shift, not an accumulation. Or worse, the shift in beliefs is the result of a socially or politically charged power game, not the growth of actual knowledge. Of course, these things are part of the picture. However, while the practice certainly can be tainted, science as an endeavor is still ultimately a choice, one that depends on the willingness to submit ones beliefs and theories to testing. 

Still, skeptics have good reason to hold that there are problems with a naïve or common-sense approach to everyday and scientific knowledge. If it is true that our present theories are the most plausible, a tautology presents itself. “What are the most plausible theories? They are our present ones.” Also, how can we know that our perceptions aren’t deceiving us (external world skepticism), and how can we know that what we’ve learned from our past or present theories is not mistaken? If we take the problem of perception seriously, direct empiricism is of little value, the thing itself will always escape us. And if we take seriously Putnam’s argument that meanings aren’t just in our heads, but are connected with other external relations (“externalism”), then how are we to get around the claim that all of our knowledge is out there with others or language-dependent, or worse, entirely socially constructed with no universal truth value? 

Searle (1995, 1998) has proposed solutions to some of these problems, in part, through his recognition of “brute” (natural realities) and “institutional” (social realities) facts. Socially constructed facts about the social world are the reality; we have language, money, and other social institutions to show for it. Yet, the external world is real, and exists independent of our thoughts about it. In similar fashion, Godfrey-Smith offers a way around this dilemma, a way that allows for common-sense realism while also allowing for the possibility of unexpected breakouts from past knowledge. Common-sense realism does assume that we can know the world in important ways, while also being responsive to naturalistic science:
Common-sense Realism Naturalized: We all in habit a common reality, which has a structure that exists independently of what people think and say about it, except insofar as reality is comprised of thoughts, theories, and other symbols, and except insofar as reality is dependent on thoughts, theories, and other symbols in ways that might be uncovered by science (2003: 176). 

Naturalized common-sense realism places a degree of faith, a degree of reasoned faith open to testing, in our ability to strive toward and accumulate knowledge through science. In large part, our ability to make discoveries and develop concepts depends on our brains and our cognitive mechanisms- a clear product of natural evolution. Therefore, the two levels of evolutionary epistemology {1-attention on Neural Darwinism or brain-based epistemology, and 2- the metatheory of the development of ideas and scientific theories through conjecture-refutation and falsification}, are clearly interconnected. Finally, while we can be quite sure that present day neurology, Darwinian Theory, and Popperian testing of theories through falsification are not perfect, we can be quite sure that they correspond more closely to external reality as compared with other past and competing theories of the natural world such as Manichaeism, Greek Monism, or Christian Creationism. 

Evolutionary epistemology and naturalized realism are the starting ground in the development of a naturalized social science. Such a social science would take stock of our deep evolutionary history while striving to stay current with new conceptualizations and discoveries in science. 

2.4 Summary of First Argument 
Knowledge grows. Knowledge shares a feedback relationship with information and intentionality. More knowledge, and the ability to access and process this knowledge, means more information and more openings for further intentionality (more choices and decisions to make, see Dennett 2003). More intentionality and information means more access to knowledge. The growth of knowledge stimulates cultural change.

3. INTENTIONALITY 

3.1 The Naturalistic Fallacy? 
Yet, even with these theoretical prerequisites in place, a naturalistic social science still faces the “naturalistic fallacy.” The naturalistic fallacy has been used in the past as a sort of blanket objection to attempts to understand culture through nature. The naturalistic fallacy is usually taken to mean that we can’t derive ought from is, related to Hume’s is/ought gap. More formally, it is a logical error in ethics attributed to Moore (see Allhoff, 2003). Usually, the naturalistic fallacy is elicited in response to attempts to explain away behavior as “natural”, and therefore determined or morally/ethically allowable. Apart from ethics (which is an admitted impossibility in a pragmatic or value-orientated social science) what’s the basic lesson we are to learn from the naturalistic fallacy? The lesson seems to be that while human beings are of course animals, human behavior cannot be reduced or subjected to natural explanations. This is because human beings have a choice to behave differently, they have consciousness, intentionality, agency, and are cultural-social animals, not instinctual animals. Therefore, simplistic “natural” explanations of human behavior simply do not apply when it comes to complex social things. This is thought to especially be the case given historical contingency, along with class, race and gender struggles, and all of the other dramas of human life- all of which are the product not of “nature”, but of our own decisions. Having decision-making power removes us in an important way from nature. 

The question of decisions is an interesting one for nature. This matter is an important one in the philosophy of mind, as Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) illustrate.
We generally assume that most adult humans are intentional agents. But when in human development do we come to be agents? Are any other animals agents, and hence deserving of the respect and protection of the law? Is it possible in principle to build agents? (170).

These questions can be asked of our developmental cycle and our evolutionary origins. Intentionality is a matter of mind. Humans have minds. But how did human consciousness evolve? And when did/do human beings gain decision-making agency? 
This is a question that psychologists love to ask. The answer is actually quite simple: from animal consciousness! There is no justification in the widespread assumption that consciousness is a unique human property (Mayr, 2001: 282).

We know our minds are quite different from those of other animals, but how different? The specifics require a look into the known and speculated nature of consciousness and intentionality. 

Generally, we can think of at least two approaches to mind- the philosophy of mind, and the hard science of neurobiology. We can be safe in assuming that most neuroscientists are well aware of the brain’s evolutionary history and the implications for understanding of how our brains work (see Wexler, 2006; and Edelman, 2006). 

In the philosophy of mind, we have available to us biologically based, naturalized understanding of the mind through the efforts of at least two prominent philosophers, John Searle and Daniel Dennett. Earlier, Popper also had a few ideas on the emergence of mind and these matters more generally.

Thinking about the mind, we should start by remembering how we got into the problem in the first place, in part through Descartes’ mind-body split. While Searle and Dennett have debates raging on some of the specifics, they both agree that Cartesian dualism needs to be rejected in favor of an understanding of the mind that has as its basis in biological naturalism and/or Neural Darwinism. 

Searle (1995, 1998, 2004) has provided a clear way around this mind-body problem by pointing out that while we indeed possess first-person qualitative/subjective/phenomenal experiences, ultimately the mind has a biological source, the brain, which our conscious experiences cannot be separated from. 

Intentionality is the special way the mind has of relating us to the world (Searle, 1998). In cognitive science, intentionality is also known as information (2004). Intentionality is often confused with directly observable sorts of direct actions, or direct intent, but is simply aboutness- to have competence about something else in our minds (Dennett, 1996). Conscious states are often intentional. However, not all conscious states are intentional, and not all intentionality is conscious. 

Consciousness and intentionality grant us agency and free will, the underlining cause of social behavior- the reason for our separate status from the rest of the natural world. The question is: Does free will alone separate us from nature? The answer is no. In fact, in a recent article scientists John Conway and Simon Kochen of Princeton University have proposed that even electrons have free will (Seed, 2006). Of course, the agency of electrons and macromolecules is different from ours. Lower-level agents are unaware of the reasons for what they do. While, 
We, in contrast, often know full well what we do. At our best- and at our worst- we human agents can perform intentional actions, after having deliberated consciously about the reasons for and against (Dennett, 1996: 20). 

As Dennett explains, the less developed sort of agency is the “ground from which the seeds of our kind of agency could grow” (21). While Searle and Dennett debate the details here too, Dennett’s notion of adopting the intentional stance clears some of the confusion surrounding mind and behavior. Summarizing,
The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a rational agent who governed its “choice” of “action” by a “consideration” of its “beliefs” and “desires” (1996: 27).

Other natural creatures have agency, and therefore agency alone does not remove us from the natural order of things. Yet, our agency is different from other entities because of our ability to perceive, process, evaluate and decide upon a course of action based on our beliefs and desires. Other creatures do some of this, but no where near us, as the most open of open behavioral systems. Therefore we are not separate from nature simply because we possess agency, but we are a special case within nature. 

Higher-order intentionality is an important advance in kinds of minds (Dennett, 1996). There is little question that the human mind represents a higher-order consciousness, as compared to lower-order conscious animals. Higher-order intentionality places us at the extreme end of the open behavioral programs, compared to closed behavior programs (Mayr, 1978). A closed behavior program is one in which little or nothing can be inserted into it through experience, its behavior is innate, typical of lower-order entities. We are open programs. The capacity for intentionality is the basis of cumulative knowledge, as well as culture. As open systems, we have the potential to change our relation to the social world through greater knowledge of the external physical world. However, 
An open program is by no means a tabula rasa; certain types of information are more easily incorporated than others. This is as true for imprinting as for ordinary learning (Mayr, 1978: 698). 

There are other factors influencing these choices as well, some neurological others ideological (Wexler, 2006).Wexler shows that ingrained patterns of belief and behavior can be difficult to shake, and also that internal structures often shape our experience of the external world in accordance with their own forms. 

Important here too is that beliefs and desires are a special case of intentionality for us. As Searle (2004) explains, as intentional states they may on appearance seem similar. But they are different. 
In the case of belief, the intentional state is supposed to represent how things are in the world. The belief is, so to speak, responsible for fitting the world. But in the case of the desire, it is not the aim of the desire to represent how things are but rather how we would like them to be. In the case of the desire it is so to speak, the responsibility of the world to fit the content of the desire (168). 

Our beliefs about the world can be true or false, or without truth value. Our beliefs are responsible for fitting the world. Our beliefs assert: “This is the way the world is.” As far as intentional states go, a true belief would seem to be more valuable to us than a false belief (but not necessarily), and also more valuable to the growth of knowledge. For the knowledge-optimist, knowledge claims based on true beliefs and accurate information will win out over false beliefs over the long haul. However, desires come into play here as well, as we well know. People, through self-interest, often wish to influence which beliefs are held as true or which false. Testing these beliefs through reason, logic, and science generally, is one way to combat this (see Kitcher, 2001; Dennett, 2006). In comparison to belief, desire has what Searle (2004) points out is a world-to-mind direction of fit. We want the world to fit what we have in our minds (something shown in the neurological research, see Wexler, 2006). Desires and intentions are not true or false in the way beliefs are, because their interest is to get external reality to match their content. In regards to the naturalistic fallacy, it is concerned with desire, the way we think the world ought to be. As an ethical consideration it does not address our beliefs about the nature of the world. It is based on value-interests. The naturalistic fallacy, the is/ought gap, addresses desires, and does not directly address beliefs. Therefore, it alone cannot be used as a reason why the social sciences should not learn lessons from external reality. It is important for the social sciences to work toward understanding both the nature of our beliefs and the nature of our desires. Both are entangled within human decisions and behavior- a matter covered in the next section. 

3.2 Summary of Second Argument
Knowledge accumulates because we are intentional creatures with memory, two prerequisites of culture. Intentionality, entailing awareness, allows us to make decisions based on available perceptual information. Consciousness and intentionality provide us the ability to decide among available options and allow us to acquire knowledge (along with memory- cognitive and cultural). There is a clear value to greater perception, knowledge and the ability to act on our environment, as an open behavioral program. 

4. DECISIONS AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION 
Reproduction and mutation ensure that evolutionary change will take place. However, if these were the only effective factors, biological evolution would proceed randomly without adaptive meaning. Natural selection is the mechanism that generates biological adaptation. In cultural evolution, however, there is in addition a second mode of selection, which is the result of the capacity for decision making (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981: 10).

In the first two sections, our capacity for decision making was reviewed in light of its biological basis, through intentionality and knowledge. Whereas accounts of culture often have it as that ethereal “superorganic” thing that endows us with our special humanness, I will argue that the usual view has things turned around, that it is our biological aptitude toward intentionality and knowledge growth that allow for culture, and are the driving force behind cultural evolution. 

4.1 What is Culture?
The social sciences have no doubt spent quite some time trying to answer the question of culture. Introductory textbooks often emphasize “norms” and “values” (Giddens et all. 2005), leaving a great deal open to interpretation. Amorphous definitions of culture, there is a case to be made, have led to many of the confusions surrounding its study in the social sciences. Reisman (2005) cites Edward Burnett Tylor’s classic definition of culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capability and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (38). 

A familiar way of approaching culture within anthropology and sociology has been to view culture as an organic whole. Culture is seen as an integrated structural whole, connected through a meaningful set of symbols, including foremost a language. Indeed, the trend within the social sciences seems to have been to view culture as a “superorganic” phenomenon (Richerson & Boyd 2006). Moreover, there has been a tendency to view culture as something almost mystical. In relation with their apparent religious and/or metaphysically implied basis, world cultures have often been seen as something sacred and more or less divinely crafted apart from the natural world. I believe it is time to seriously reconsider this view. 

4.2 A Revised View of Culture
Richerson and Boyd (1985, 2006). argue that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior. While this point is quite amenable to the social sciences, the next two are likely not for many. These are that: 1) culture is part of biology, and that culture cannot be understood without 2) population thinking. Richerson and Boyd present a much-needed reclassification of culture. I am in agreement with Richerson and Boyd when they suggest that:
…the most fundamental questions of how humans came to be the kind of animal we are can only be answered by a theory in which culture has its proper role and in which it is intimately intertwined with other aspects of human biology (2006: 4). 

Population thinking is important, as Mayr recognized was one of Darwin’s key contributions to biology. Population thinking is not only attractive because of its origins with Darwin, but because it offers a plausible explanation of the properties of species, including humans- with their special aptitude for culture. Population thinking is at the center of Richerson and Boyd’s theory of culture, which they concisely define below.
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission (2006: 5; italics theirs)

The difference from the classical definitions here is the focus placed on information; as opposed to something more ethereal or less tangible. “Information is not a metaphorical term needing to be cashed into something else. It is the reality” (Runciman, 2005a: 5). Information entails any kind of mental state, conscious or not, acquired or modified through social learning and affects behavior. Information may also be described as idea, knowledge, belief, value, skill, attitude, and so. The difference from classical definitions becomes even more apparent when we consider an important addition: “most cultural variation is caused by information stored in human brains- information that got into those brains by learning from others” (Richerson and Boyd, 2006: 5).

From this view of culture, individuals’ brains or minds are at the center of scrutiny. We might contrast, for instance, Durkheim’s (1982) contention that social facts differ not only in quality from individual psychologically held facts, but also they have a different substratum, something other than just individual brains or psychology. What exactly this substratum is in Durkheim’s thinking, however, is intangible, and far from certain. 

It is then individuals who have learned different sets of information in the form of skills, values, and beliefs, depending on their cultural history and learning, which may take many forms, individual and social. Culture is the collection of information stored and transmitted by individuals who comprise collections of groups, or populations. “Culture is the form that biology takes” (Searle 1995: 227). 

Understanding culture in this way makes more apparent the connections between evolved human brains, human psychology, and human culture. The point that stems from here is that population thinking makes for an apt link between cultural and genetic evolution. The “superorganic” view of culture, culture as some sort of collective consciousness unto itself, is rejected, with a grounded naturalist one taking its place. 

4.3 Decisions, Nature, and Cultural Evolution
With a revised view of culture presented, the question now becomes how to understand culturalchange? I believe Richerson and Boyd present a convincing case, and in part, a convincing explanation through their model of gene-culture coevolution (or dual inheritance). 

The term that Richerson and Boyd use to identify the informational content of cultures is cultural variant. Cultural variants are not necessarily “memes” (Dawkins’ term). They are not high-fidelity discrete units, cultural variants are not exact “replicators.” 

Cultural variants are passed on in all of the usual ways that social scientists and anthropologists talk about when they talk about socialization and enculturation. The selection of cultural variants is influenced by the forces of cultural evolution. Cultural variants compete, like variations in organisms compete. They are believed to compete in two related ways. They compete for cognitive resources of the learner, and for control of behavior. Cultures are not necessarily tightly structured wholes. 

Just as biological communities rarely exist in a perfect state of equilibrium, neither do human cultural communities. While there are many examples of the remarkable staying power of human culture, such as Anabaptist cultures in the midst of modernization, such examples should not persuade us into thinking of culture as some sort of permanent Platonic form. Culture is mostly information in brains. But the content of this information goes through ebbs and flows in response to changes in available cultural variants, knowledge, and not to mention other large-scale societal, institutional, economic, and environmental changes. 

Different cultural variants compete, even those without any determinable truth-value. For example, which Christian denomination’s version of the Trinity do I believe in? Cultural variants compete amongst one another within the same selective environment. From a population perspective of culture the selective environment is the individual human brain, or mind. Human brains are roughly common, and therefore provide a roughly common environment for cultural variants to compete within. Human brains pick and choose amongst the available pool of cultural variants. But brains do not exist in a vacuum; of course, there are other forces at work. 

According to Richerson and Boyd, these are the “forces of cultural evolution.” These forces are identified as: random forces, including “ cultural mutation” and “ cultural drift”; and there are decision-making forces, including “ guided variation and biased transmission” (2006: 69). Decision-making forces involve those things we often think of when we think of the special character of humanness, involving will, decisions, and choices. We do not tend to think of these things as subject to natural processes or natural selection. This distinction is made by Richerson and Boyd, and others working on cultural evolution.

Here though, I will argue against the idea that natural selection and decisions (in the forms of guided variation and biased transmission- which entail social forces) need to be distinguished on conceptual grounds, leaving decisions free from naturalized understandings. 

We have already covered some of this ground by focusing on the question of intentionality and decision-making in nature. The question of decisions and nature is one we often gloss over. The usual thinking goes something like: “humans make decisions; the rest of nature is purely instinctual, behavioral, or determined.” 

But nature makes decisions too. “I think we have to admit that the universe is creative, or inventive”, noticed Popper (1978). 

What seems clear is that organisms other than human beings have a degree of intentionality and decision making ability. Having intentionality and an ability to make decisions (“do I chase the wildebeest now or wait ‘till later,” decides the lion) does not remove these organisms from “nature” or a naturalistic analysis of their behavior. Neither do we remove from nature the powerful and influential silverback gorilla, who influences many of the decisions of those others who he comes into contact with. Like earlier, I want to suggest that human intentionality itself is not enough to remove human beings and their decisions from what we broadly understand as nature, including its mechanisms and principles. 

Therefore, a properly natural view of culture is not only acceptable, but vital. Decision-making forces, including biased transmission, need not be separated from natural selection or a more broadly conceived view of human beings (and their decisions) as part of “nature.” We have more intentionality than most animals, certainly true. But the matter is one of degree, not kind. As a result; there are no grounds upon with to rest the widely accepted “superorganic” understanding and approach to human culture.  

4.4 Decisions, Innovation, and Co-Evolution (Biology and Culture)
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) have worked on their well-known characterization of the innovation-decision process in social/cultural change for some time. The importance of knowledge and its relation with decision making is generally well studied within ration-choice theories. However, I do not believe that the full implications of the relationships between knowledge, decisions, innovations, and social/cultural outcomes as a co-evolutionary process between biology and culture is either well understood or well studied within the social sciences more generally. Durham (1991) and Richerson and Boyd (2006) make this case well. Echoing their call, I am not suggesting here that I fully understand the implications yet either. However, the suggestion here is that there is indeed something going on, something that might have us soon re-thinking “human nature”, species, and Aristotle’s long held distinction between natural and artificial beings. Through radical advances in the life sciences and nanotechnology we may be ushering in a new age of natural and artificial kinds (see Lin and Allhoff, 2005; Goertzel and Bugaj, 2006). 

Part of my argument here is that without a naturalized understanding of such things we fundamentally miss the point. What is interesting is that in adopting a natural stance, we open ourselves up to the tremendous importance of culture in shaping nature itself. But if we by-pass nature, as much of social science seems content to do, we fail to realize how important decisions, knowledge and culture are in shaping our world, social and natural. The prospect of nanotechnology forces recognition of this interplay of social decisions and natural outcomes. What is interesting here too is that in adopting the natural stance, we can see along with Ernst Mayr that the emergence of real novelty in the course of evolution should be regarded as a fact (Popper, 1978). 

4.5 Summary of Third Argument
The ability to decide between beliefs, desires, and behaviors through intentionality is the basis of knowledge growth. Earlier, intentionality was likened to information (as is the case in neuroscience). More information means more options and more decisions to make. The argument here is that culture is also a form of information. Culture is the collection of information we decide to go with. It is the information we impose upon ourselves or have imposed upon us by others through learning and/or other forces. Culture is ideational (consisting of ideas, beliefs, values) and behavior. Our behavior does not always correspond with our ingrained or professed culture. As open behavior systems, we can make decisions between alternative ideas, beliefs and behaviors. We can make decisions, informed (by information), or uninformed. But as our experiences, as well as neurological and social psychological research shows, it is easy for beliefs and behaviors to become ingrained, and seem to be the only option available to us. 

5.0 CONCLUSION: SUMARIZING THE ARGUMENT TO SOCIAL SCIENCE 
There is a serious failure in the social sciences to recognize in a significant way the relational aspects of culture, society, psychology, and nature in the study of society and human behavior. Examining more deeply the implications of culture as information and human cultures and societies as populations will have a significant impact on the traditional separation of the cultural domain from social institutions, and both from innate psychology. All three have a relation back to their foundation in brute evolutionary biology. 

The suggestion that a selectionist approach “anesthetizes” history is untenable. This is because rich and expansive historical accounts matter both to historians and evolutionists. No one is interested in a simple reduction to “biological explanations”, especially in so far as we are dealing with comparative anthropological or sociological research. Further, another objection has been that cultural evolution is committed to some arbitrary criterion of progress. But this point is easily refuted by pointing out that the understanding of maladaption is just as important as adaptation. Runciman (1999, 2005a&b) points out that it is futile to search for law like regularities that hold good through the ages and across the globe, as Marxism was suppose to with the its stages from ancient to feudal to capitalist to communist modes of production. A variational understanding of evolution is interested in mechanisms and contingent outcomes, not law-like regularities.

Obviously there is still much for social and natural science to study here, in fact, the argument is that such an approach substantially opens up the study of culture.

Throughout this paper, I have been arguing that it is time for the social sciences to respond to a naturalist realist approach to culture and cultural evolution. A more accurate picture of culture does not overshadow its biological basis. A more accurate picture of culture represents the relational aspects of culture and biology. Darwinian conceptual tools from evolutionary biology provide a solid theoretical groundwork, conceptual clarity, and useful generalizations when it comes to providing a better understanding of complex human behavior. Important to add here is that this is a unifying approach, one that does not reduce the study of culture to genes. Rather, in many ways it extends the study of culture, showing just how important culture is in human society, and more profoundly, how important culture is in the history of human evolution, and its future direction. 

ENDNOTES 

For example, see documentary film Who Killed the Electric Car. http://www.sonyclassics.com/whokilledtheelectriccar/.

While major debates between Duhem-Quine’s coherentism and Popper’s ideas on falsification exist.

Mathematical formulism, as borrowed from population genetics, game theory, and economics, is also an important aspect of Richerson and Boyd’s work (2006: p. 95).

Social Norms & Law: An Introduction

Theory & Science (2007) : ISSN: 1527-5558

Social Norms & Law: An Introduction 

Patrick S. O’Donnell, Adjunct Instructor
Department of Philosophy , Santa Barbara City College 

I - Social Norms 
With sufficient reason it has been said, ‘like cows, social norms are easier to recognize than to define’ (Basu 1998). Social norms are the motley of informal, often unspoken rules, guides and standards of behavior the authority for which is vague if not diffuse, and the communal sanction for which can be swift and cutting. These nonlegal rules and obligations are followed and fulfilled in part because failure to do so brings upon the transgressor such social sanctions as induced feelings of guilt or shame, gossip, shunning, ostracism, and not infrequently, violence. In one sense, to be sure, their authority and power is that of ‘the group,’ i.e., relations between individuals, multiplicity of relations, and relations among those relations (cf. Caws 1984). And that group is phenomenologically captured with ‘the Look’ of ‘the Other,’ the Look symbolizing those sanctions for norm violation that entail a disparaging glance or expression of disapproval or disgust, often as a prelude to shunning, ostracism or violence. This is one reason effective norms typically have strong roots in the soil of small groups and communities, as sanctions are ready at hand and swiftly applied. And yet, as Philip Pettit argues, sanctions or rewards for norm noncompliance or compliance need not involve intentional expression through word or deed: ‘…[P]eople are rewarded by being thought well of, and punished by being thought badly of, whether or not those attitudes are intentionally expressed. And I can know that I am rewarded or punished in such a manner by others—I can bask in their good opinion or smart under their bad opinion—without their actually doing anything’ (Pettit 2002, pp. 280-81). The feeling of guilt or shame may make the external enforcement of internalized norms unnecessary. Among the tangible and intangible rewards attached to the compliance with social norms one finds increased esteem, trust and, most importantly, cooperation. 

From table manners to rites of passage (from birth to death) marked by routine, solemnity or celebration, conformity to social norms can bring in their wake social order and successful collective action, while creating and maintaining cultural meaning(s). Similar to the Sartrian notion of the practico-inert (Caws 1984, pp. 155-88), social norms can appear inscribed with the necessities of nature, their exigencies unavoidable and ubiquitous, emblematic of both obstacle and opportunity. Historically, and at least up until the modern period, norms have changed rather slowly; yet our own time retains something of the stability and persistence of norms: ‘Where faddism is the norm, the rapid succession of fads indicates norm stability not instability’ (Posner and Rasmusen 1999, p. 379). Still, norms can and often do rapidly change, a comforting thought when considering norms of a perverse or pernicious variety (e.g. the duel or vendetta). Norm entrepreneurs responsible for initiating bandwagon effects and norm cascades (Sunstein 1997, p. 38), for example, can change norms for better and worse. 

Some social norms are universal (e.g., the prohibition of incest), while others are more localized, what Elster (1989) calls ‘group specific:’ owning a Volvo station wagon among middle class ‘soccer moms’ in Santa Barbara, California (at any rate, before the advent of the luxury SUV), or workers and managers with differing views on what constitutes ‘fair distribution’ (p. 99). Social norms, as such, are neither good nor bad, but rather become benefit or burden insofar as they facilitate or constrain behavior guided by moral values, practical reasons or instrumental ends: ‘Social norms do coordinate expectations. They may or may not help people to achieve cooperation’ (p. 97). The behavior guided by these norms may be strongly reinforced by self-interest, as is the case with group norms of ‘exclusion’ and ‘difference’ (Hardin 1995). Russell Hardin argues that self-interest is in fact paramount in those self-enforcing universalistic norms sustained by dyadic and small number interactions, like promise-keeping and truth-telling, wherein one will have a long-term interest in maintaining the relationship served by the norm. Moreover, universalistic norms without dyadic sanctions or enforcement are often comparatively weak, as would be a norm of trustworthiness in a large society. 

One is hard-pressed to argue with C. Fred Alford’s (1994) contention that ‘to exclude, ridicule, ignore, belittle, or criticize an outsider is a time-honored way of creating cohesion within a group’ (p. 29). And questions of the dynamics of group relations, toward enhancing cohesion or otherwise, might interest us if only because 
impressive clinical evidence indicates that regardless of the individual’s maturity and psychological integration, certain group conditions tend to bring on regression and activate primitive psychological levels. Small, closed, and unstructured groups—as well as groups that are large, minimally structured, and lacking clearly defined tasks to relate them to their environment—tend to bring about immediate regression in the individual, a regression that consists in the activation of defensive operations and interpersonal processes that reflect primitive object relations (Kernberg 1998, p. 7).

The role of social norms vis-à-vis such fine-grained group-psychological dynamics is largely terra incognita in the legal literature. 

The operation of social norms often takes place, as it were, behind our backs, with some degree of self-consciousness regarding norms surfacing in cases of egregious or frequent norm violation or, for instance, when a subcultural group, such as a gang, draws attention to itself through its regular and flagrant (or flamboyant) violation of popular or culturally predominant norms, thereby remaining true to the dominant norm within their group. As Cass Sunstein (1997) notes, in their own way, individual members of such groups ‘may be the most committed of conformists.’ Collective awareness or reflexivity regarding many social norms thus appears, in the first instance, dependent upon norm violation. Brennan and Pettit (2004) accordingly speak of 
norms that most of us are barely conscious of taking our guidance from, since they are not often supported in a surrounding discourse of general commendation and critique and are not reflected in levels of common or mutual awareness. They may include the norms that govern turn taking in conversation, the use of eyes in relation to others, the distance at which one stands in speaking to another, and a host of such unnoticed but not merely mechanical regularities (p. 282).

And while the internalization of social norms may take place below the surface of consciousness, what bears repeating is the proposition suggested at the outset by Pettit and reiterated here by the economist Kaushik Basu (1998): ‘It is worth adding that at times social norms can get internalized to the extent that they do not need social enforcement, and are adhered to by individuals of their own accord’ (p. 2). The absence of social enforcement is a form of direct motivation, whereas the use of sanctions is a form of indirect motivation for norm compliance. We have sufficient warrant at this juncture to draw a tentative conclusion to the effect that (in some sense) social norms are capable of choreographing much of our lives in the daily round: the intriguing question revolving around the identification of who or what, in the end, is the choreographer? Who is authorized or qualified to change the choreography? Are all choreographies of equal significance or worth? What are the relevant criteria for assessing various choreographies?

Social norms are in fact omnipresent: from the bedroom to the boardroom, and often obdurate and opaque: after all, traditions might be thought of as those social norms that have the ‘sanction of time.’ But accounting for the tenacity and opacity of traditions has proven conspicuously elusive to social scientists and professional philosophers. While it serves some purposes to distinguish social norms from tradition (Elster 1989), it’s often quite difficult to make hard and fast categorical distinctions between traditions and customs on one hand, and social norms on the other, as there’s clearly a strong (Wittgensteinian) family resemblance if not genetic relation between all three phenomena. 

II – Legal Theory and Social Norms
Heretofore, and perhaps by default, the study of social norms has largely been the prerogative of anthropologists and sociologists. Today, however, legal theorists, including law-and-economics devotees, have engaged in trans-disciplinary cognitive border raids and trades, one consequence of which is that by ‘the mid-1990s, norms became one of the hottest topics in the legal academy’ (Ellickson 1998). Legal scholars in the areas of constitutional law, tort law, contract law, and criminal law have all looked to social norms as a possible means to address significant or recalcitrant problems in their respective areas specialization (see Massaro in Bandes 1999). In part this interest in social norms was a direct consequence of learning the range of utility for rational choice models in the law-and-economics genre. In little over a decade’s time, the interest in social norms has noticeably cooled, conspicuously in criminal law, the one legal domain where the descriptive findings of social norm models may have had the least presumptive relevance for proposals designed to change targeted behaviors. In this instance, programmatic engineering or tinkering with social norms has proven ineffective if only because ‘criminal law typically enters where social norms’ hold is strongest among nonoffenders but is, for complex reasons, not powerful enough to deter offenders’ (Massaro in Bandes 1999, p. 91). Robert Weisburg (2003) makes the selfsame point in an especially pellucid article: ‘in its loose eclecticism, norms analysis is peculiarly incongruent with the realm of criminal law, because the criminals society most and most rightly fears, exhibit both a pathological indifference to, and a compulsive inability to obey, the social norms that supposedly guide good behavior’ (p. 470). 

Legal minds still infatuated with social norms that rely on a relatively weak grasp of the mechanisms of complex emotions, would do well to heed an argument from Martha Nussbaum in Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (2004). Nussbaum finds that one of the emotions criminal law theorists have given inordinate attention to, namely shame, ‘is likely to be normatively unreliable in public life, despite its potential for good’ (p. 15). Indeed, those who have predicated their proposed criminal law reforms upon putative shaming mechanisms have conspicuously failed to realize ‘how labile, complex, and ill understood this basic emotion is’ (Massaro in Bandes 1999, pp. 91-92). Even John Braithwaite’s (1989) fairly nuanced criminological theory of ‘reintegrative shaming,’ which Nussbaum is otherwise sympathetic to, is criticized for failing to sufficiently distinguish guilt from shame. She would in fact simply re-classify his proposal within the (Kantian) ‘universe of guilt punishments’ (pp. 240-41). In short, although some forms of shame undoubtedly have positive ethical value, cognizance of the various pathologies that may be prompted by social shaming should preclude facile reliance on this emotion in the propagation of social norms designed to be conducive to individual flourishing and the common good (cf. Markel, 2001 and 2007). 

And while Nussbaum does explore some cross-cultural issues in the study of such emotions as disgust and shame, much of the literature on social norms has a rather parochial and provincial quality to it. This of course need not be a liability insofar as the legal order is likewise parochial or provincial, but in an era of globalization, with transnational (e.g. the European Union) and international legal orders, arbitrary or ill-considered national and cultural circumscription of the social scientific and scholarly work in this regard may render this literature irrelevant to many of our more salient or urgent economic, political, and environmental issues and problems. Moreover, beginning with the seminal studies of Solomon and de Sousa, and most recently evidenced, for example, in works by Ben-Ze’ev, Elster, Goldie, and Nussbaum, there is a growing body of excellent philosophical and psychological studies of the emotions. Unfortunately this literature has yet to systematically treat the relation between the emotions and social norms in a manner both befitting the concerns of legal practitioners and reflective of the clarity indispensable for any legal theory with philosophical integrity. No doubt the disciplinary division of labor and the trends toward increased cognitive specialization can be invoked as prominent explanatory variables. In this respect, Nussbaum’s Hiding from Humanity, alongside the work of Robert Solomon (below), is uncommon and timely, perhaps portending more studies along these lines capable of meeting such desiderata 

A rather succinct description of the generation of social norms is found in Brennan and Pettit’s The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society (2004): “Norms materialize as regularities in social life, because there is general approval for the pattern of behavior involved, disapproval for the failure to elicit that behavior, or the expectation of such general approval or disapproval” (p. 267). In this account, social norms are created and persist with the ‘intangible hand’ of an ‘economy of esteem,’ a hand whose prints are distinct from both the ‘invisible hand of the marketplace’ and the ‘iron hand of the state.’ That said, we are reminded that ‘both the institutions of the market and the law themselves presuppose and depend upon a regime of robust supportive norms’ (p. 265). While Brennan and Pettit present us with a more than plausible picture of the generation (the how and why) of social norms, they don’t really endeavor to explain the processes by which these norms are internalized. This explanatory lacuna has, however, been courageously addressed in an article by Robert Cooter (1996), well and succinctly summarized here by his sometime collaborator, Melvin Eisenberg (1999):
[Cooter] focuses on three processes by which social norms are internalized: a Freudian process, in which the repressed memory of parental sanctions for childhood transgressions becomes transmuted into an adult superego; a Piagetian process, in which children perfect their ability to internalize norms as they acquire the capacity for general reasoning; and a Weberian process in which actors internalize the norms of social roles (pp. 15-16).

I leave it to others to assess the cogency of Cooter’s explanatory account of the internalization of social norms, an account of merit owing to its recognition of the need for some sort of social-psychological explanation in the process of norm internalization, consolidation, and persistence. 

As much of human behavior is subject to norm constraints and the penalties attached to their violation (be it shame, guilt, shunning, exclusion, ostracism, or emotional and physical violence), or the rewards attached to their compliance (increased esteem, trust, cooperative behavior), it helps to distinguish between moral, social and legal norms. For our purposes, we’ll elide the differences between the first two (i.e., ignoring moral norms as such), assuming that some social norms are at the same time moral norms or contain moral principles, and focus instead on the distinction between social norms in general and legal norms in particular, highlighting the contrast between social norms and those legal norms directly or indirectly associated with the institutions or prerogatives of the State. 

Whilst the distinction between social and legal norms may be transparent with respect to the functions and responsibilities of the State, it is the interaction or precise relation between these two kinds of norms that are the particular foci of legal theorists. The precise locus of theoretical concern is analogous to the differences in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy between the Rawls of a Theory of Justice (1971) and the Nozick of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Thus libertarians (Nozick) by temperament are inclined to appreciate that set of collective action problems seemingly solved by social norms apart from or irrespective of the State, while contemporary liberals (Rawls) call upon the State and its legal norms to—so to speak—fill in the gaps left by insufficient or inefficient norm compliance (yet both Rawls and Nozick draw upon this or that feature of Kantian ethics, and both are Liberals in the philosophical and historical sense). 

However, economists of a libertarian bent, like neoclassical economists in general, rely on a rational choice methodology (on which, see Amadeae 2003, Cox 2004, Hausman 2003, Sen 2002, Green and Shapiro 2005, and Udehn 2003) that privileges preferences produced by ‘rational self-interest’ and thus is not, in general, well-suited to an appreciation of social norms (yet see Eric Posner below). There is increasing recognition of this fact from within economics: 
Although sociologists and anthropologists have long understood the central role played by norms, economists have traditionally viewed them as peripheral to economic decisions (notable exceptions are Thomas Schelling, George Akerlof, and Robert Sugden). The fact is, however, the norms influence terms of employment, the amount that people save and consume, attitudes toward debt, decisions about when to retire, and a host of other economic variables. Even property rights are governed to a considerable extent by social expectations about who is entitled to what [references omitted] (Young 2005).

Whatever the limitations of rational choice methodology—and those are perhaps more apparent in political science and sociology than in economics—it is hard to quibble with Elster’s conclusion that ‘the continued dominance of neoclassical theory is ensured by the fact that one can’t beat something with nothing’ (Elster 1986, p. 27). 

The theoretical debate here is chock full of practical implications and consequences for public policy, as all sides well realize. The fundamental point from a public policy perspective is that any theory of institutional design or regulation must minimally consider two questions: 1) what existing social norms work with or against our regulatory (legal) purposes, and 2) the likelihood that a regulatory regime will give rise to yet new norms or increase the salience of otherwise weak or dormant norms (Pettit 2002). Needless to say, these are not tasks for the sociologically timid or politically faint of heart, but remain the sorts of questions legal theorists are constitutionally equipped—with the requisite transdisciplinary sophistication—to consider.
A social norm may arise or persist because of its contribution to solving a co-ordination problem, for instance when it supports or facilitates a ‘convention’ (Lewis 1969) wherein members of a group realize a benefit by conforming to a behavioral regularity (thereby achieving the equilibrium so enchanting to neo-classical economists). Norms that reinforce self-interest (e.g., everyone driving on the right side of the road, or the left as the case may be), while assisting in the formation of equilibrium, are what Basu terms, appropriately enough, ‘equilibrium-selection norm[s].’ Such norms are the bailiwick of economists, given their behavioral affinity with the exiting topical foci of neo-classical economics. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain exactly which norms support or go against self-interest, for what at first may appear to be an instance of the latter, may turn out on closer inspection to be yet another example of the former: 

a person in need can expect help from other members of the tribe or the village, the explicit understanding being that the help will be reciprocated at other times when fortunes are reversed. This norm can be thought of as a rationality-limiting norm [Basu using ‘rationality’ here in the constricted sense of the economist] since the person who helps out the destitute seems to do so against his self-interest. But we can take a long-term perspective on this and argue that if an individual refuses to help when it is his turn, the whole system can collapse. And so, in a manner akin to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the norm of reciprocity may be an equilibrium-selection norm (Basu 1998, p.5).

Insofar as social norms have permeated virtually every nook and cranny of collective behavior, their significance for solving collective action problems is not surprising. It is the precise delineation of that role and its mechanisms vis-à-vis the law, however, that causes all the trouble, as a comparison between the work of Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner will make clear below. Stefan Sciaraffa (2005) here explains how social norms are germane to application of the negligence standard in tort law: 
Most cases in tort law are governed by the negligence standard. Under this standard, a defendant is liable for injury to another only if the injury resulted from her ignorance. Negligence is a failure to meet a standard of reasonable care. In some contexts, courts have held that actions in conformity with a prevailing social norm meet, as a matter of law, the standard of reasonable care (the per se rule). In other contexts, the courts have held that the fact that the defendant has followed the prevailing social norms is evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether the defendant has met the standard of reasonable care (the evidentiary rule). In yet other contexts, courts have held that the defendant’s following the prevailing social norms has no evidentiary value whatsoever (the no-evidence rule). The modern rule of custom rejects the per se rule in favor of the evidentiary rule save for one major exception—cases of medical malpractice (and perhaps other cases of professional malpractice). A medical professional’s conformity to or failure to follow the norms of the medical community constitutes per se reasonable care or negligence, respectively. 

And in addition to the fact that it is not easy to draw a sharp distinction between social norms and law, the relation between them is not simply or only a matter of preferring one over the other (non-coercion v. coercion), as roles (father, merchant, citizen, etc.) and their attendant norms can be (and frequently are) fortified by legal requirements: indeed, some roles ‘may even owe their existence to law’ (Sunstein 1997, p. 43). So law may, indirectly or circuitously, contribute to the creation and maintenance of social norms, not simply replace them, as was the case historically with some norms of retribution, such as the blood feud. 

In addition to the creation, maintenance or elimination of social norms, and the direct invocation of social norms (as in the example above from tort law), the law may also serve as a medium of sublimation: ‘often violent demands for vengeance may be sublimated and satisfied by law’ (Solomon in Bandes 1999, p. 124). This is a provocative thesis, distinguishable from the aforementioned concerns of Massaro and Weisburg. Robert Solomon, prominent among a select group of philosophers responsible for making the study of the emotions respectable in contemporary analytic philosophy (beyond its prior obsession with epistemology and philosophy of language) persuasively argues that ‘vengeance is not just the desire to harm but the desire to punish for good reason and to the right measure’ (p. 142). Solomon elaborates: 
In many cultures (let us not leap to label them ‘primitive’), vengeance and avenging wrongs are a matter of personal and family honor. In civil society, vengeance and avenging wrongs are a matter of personal and family honor. In civil society, vengeance and avenging wrongs become matters of common justice and law, but they are not thereby rendered irrelevant to the proceedings (p. 129). 

And why are they not irrelevant? ‘It is the heart of vengeance as well as the basis for criminal law, the idea that the punishment should “fit” the crime’ (p. 137). Solomon concludes that while vengeance admittedly is a ‘powerful and therefore dangerous passion,’ its sublimation in both civil and criminal law helps us to appreciate its ‘capacity for rationality, prudence, and cultural shaping’ as well (p. 144). 

III – Social Norms and Public Policy
Cass Sunstein believes government should have a more explicit or avowed—more deliberate (read ‘deliberative,’ although Sunstein is not always clear as to what is uniquely deliberative about the democratic mechanisms and processes assumed or cited)—role in norm management or governance. To cite just one of many possible examples, a change in the norms that surround the consumption of alcohol has the potential to dramatically reduce the risk of illness and death associated with that consumption. Like Ronald Dworkin, Sunstein is sensitive to what he calls the law’s ‘expressive function,’ that is, law’s capacity to embody or express our deepest (or highest) social values and commitments, for instance, autonomy or self-determination, liberty and equality, human rights and social welfare or well-being. In sum, these democratic values and principles, like the ideal (collective self-rule) of democracy itself, should be reflected or realized in, exemplified or approached by, the methods, practices and processes of democratic legal regulation and governance. A liberal democratic regime, argues Sunstein, should work (perhaps as part of a paternalistic obligation) to eliminate or transform those social norms that are clear impediments to a fuller instantiation or realization of liberal and democratic values and commitments or, more specifically if not controversially, those norms that manifestly inhibit the creation or maintenance of the requisite conditions for and propitious to human flourishing (eudaimonia), or to the ideal of moral and political autonomy (conceived in terms of self-direction or self-governance, and best construed as a developmental achievement or outcome) (cf.: Wall 2003, and Norton 1991). 

To the extent that putatively private preferences or choices are determined by (anti-democratic) social norms—that is, norms that interfere with the rational pursuit of our freely (i.e., autonomously) expressed rational choices and preferences—the government finds (sufficient, legitimate, justifiable) reason for (paternalistic) intervention. One way to conceptualize such intervention comes courtesy of the title of a recent paper by Sunstein and Thaler (2003): ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron.’ Individual and collective preferences, as captured by rational choice models of behavior, may accord unwarranted weight to perverse preferences (‘adaptive preferences’ in the literature: see Elster 1983, and Nussbaum 2000, pp. 111-166), that is, preferences shaped by existing anti-democratic or anti-eudaimonistic social norms:
For example, women who are systematically denied roles in public life or equal shares of consumption goods may learn not to want these things. Their level of preference satisfaction may then be much higher than their level of well-being. It seems that those who are benevolent need to consider not just preferences, but the origins of preferences or the justifiability of preferences. Women who have been systematically oppressed may not have strong preferences for individual liberties, the same wages that men earn, or even for protection from domestic violence. But liberties, high wages, and protection from domestic violence may make them better off than giving them what they prefer. Satisfying preferences that result from coercion, manipulation, or ‘perverse’ preference formation mechanisms may not make people better off (Hausman and McPherson 1996, p. 79). 

Thus one might see how particular social norms could be held liable for manipulable or perverse preference formation, what Basu (2000) has labeled ‘preference-changing norms’ (p. 73). Robert Goodin (1995, pp. 132-148) argues that richer ‘utility’ information may suffice for ‘laundering’ such ‘dirty’ preferences, such information to include knowledge of the causal origin and mechanisms of entrenchment of the implicated social norms.

In other words, the government might find any number of legitimate or justifiable reasons to intervene on behalf of our deepest (liberally) democratic social values and commitments, recalling that the primary justification for government flows from its capacity to solve collective action problems, whether or not those problems are caused or exacerbated by any social norm: ‘where there is a collective responsibility to coordinate individual behavior in pursuit of some morally important goal, it is legitimate for the collectivity to impose sanctions upon individuals in pursuit of that goal’ (Goodin 1995, p. 40). Were it not for the entrenchment of social norms of reciprocity, work and consumption, or norms of fairness and ‘everyday Kantianism’ (Elster 1989), it appears we would often require recourse to differing degrees of legal coercion or state regulated economic incentives to coordinate our behavior and accomplish many of our collective ends. 

The latest and most analytically consistent attempt to understand social norms from within legal theory (of the law-and-economics variety or genre) is proffered by Eric Posner (2000), and is grounded in economics and game theory (loosely, ‘behavioral economics’), the latter a rational choice methodology. We cannot here do justice to the analytical merits of Posner’s ‘signaling game,’ in which people engage in behavioral regularities in order to communicate to others their willingness, fitness or desirability as potential partners in co-operative endeavors. Suffice it to say, a social norm describes behavior that spontaneously emerges in ‘signaling equilibriums’ or behavioral regularities in social interaction. It is in one’s self-interest to earn a ‘reputation’ as a co-operative player (the ‘good’ or cooperative type, as opposed to the ‘bad’ or opportunistic type), and there are many ways to solidify or enhance—signal—one’s reputation (e.g. gift giving). 

The simplicity and clarity of Posner’s model for explaining widespread compliance with many social norms suggests that any legal theory worthy of the appellation will be compelled to cite Posner’s model, if only by way of an evaluative or comparative baseline. Posner’s study provides ample reason for proceeding with due care and caution when it comes to government initiated norm change, given the current state of our knowledge about the operation of social norms in post-industrialized affluent societies, and the strong probability that unintended consequences and perverse effects might very well reverse the causal direction of Mandeville’s perverse arrow: from public benefits to private vices. 

Ann Carlson (2003) is, like Sunstein, a bit more confident about working with social norms as a tool of public policy, particularly with regard to environmental regulation. Carlson suggests we scrupulously observe the following innocuous if not meager methodological prescriptions: ‘in evaluating the efficacy of social norms as a regulatory tool we should pay close attention to the nature of the social problem at issue, the context in which it arises, and the availability of other regulatory options’ (p. 24). Empirical studies suggest, not surprisingly, that group size and individual payoff are variables that affect the likelihood norms will solve or manage social problems: the smaller the size of the group affected by a social problem, the more likely norms will be an effective antidote; and the larger the economic incentive for group members to address a problem, the more likely social norms will prove a successful policy prescription: ‘Thus norms should work best in small-number, large-payoff groups’ (p. 4, cf. Ellickson 1991). This might be seen as illustrating the proposition that signaling mechanisms intrinsic to Posner’s model are subject to something like economies of scale, although the locus of precise tipping points, that is, the point at which it is difficult if not impossible for signaling mechanisms to have rippling or reverberative effects is not easy to determine. 

IV - Concluding Reflections 
Brian Tamanaha (2001) has rightly cautioned legal theorists against confusing (or conflating) the legal system with the creation and maintenance of social order simpliciter (‘law and order’ ideology), otherwise termed the ‘Hobbesian presumption.’ Of course such a warning would be unnecessary in anthropological and sociological circles wherein it has long been recognized (e.g., Durkheim and Parsons) that there are sources of order in tandem with, apart from, or prior to the State (e.g., in that social space designated as ‘civil society’) responsible for the ‘substantial coordination of behaviour’ (Tamanaha 2001, p. 211). Tamanaha offers a typology of sources for social order that will not detain us here except to mention his reiteration of the fact that social norms and related roles ‘make a major contribution to the coordination of behaviour’ (p. 216). Belated recognition of this fact is news of a sort only within legal theory! Indeed, I suspect several of Tamanaha’s sources of social order (e.g., what he calls the ‘unarticulated substrate’—a source/type inspired by a (later) Wittgensteinian understanding of language as well as Habermas’s notion of the ‘lifeworld’) could and should be subsumed within the category of social norms. 

Tamanaha’s main point is that ‘the traditionally assumed relationship’ between state law and social order crystallized in the Hobbesian presumption among legal theorists,‘ gets things backwards or upside down. It is state law that is dependent on these other sources of social order if it is to have a chance of exerting an influence (p. 224). In going beyond the Hobbesian presumption wherein social order is a direct result of a contractual agreement, or in supplementing rational choice models (including game theory) in which social orders (e.g., markets) are the unintended yet fortuitous outcome of actions ruled by rational calculations, the belated recognition of the salience of social norms in legal theory is a welcome development. Perhaps now legal theorists (in addition to those who, like Dennis Patterson, are already ‘Wittgensteinian’) will take greater notice of the ‘practice turn’ in contemporary theorizing about the constitution of social order (see Schatzki 1996 and 2002, Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Savigny 2001, Patterson 2004). 

In conclusion, the current literature connecting social norms to legal theory suggests a philosophically prudent public policy should probably fall out somewhere betwixt and between Sunstein’s enthusiasm and Posner’s modesty. At the very least, policy prescriptions and changes in the law based upon—at this point in time—our comparatively weak understanding of social norms, and the emotions that fortify them (or simply the pertinent social psychological mechanisms), suggest we proceed with due caution and reticence. All the same, it behooves legal practitioners and students of the law in general to maintain an abiding and deep interest in the role of social norms in the coordination of behavior, if only by way of understanding social phenomena that eludes (or supplements) the explanatory scope of rational choice theories. In the same vein, legal theorists interested in social norms (their different philosophical assumptions and perspectives notwithstanding) should overcome their exclusive enchantment with neo-classical economics, engaging their colleagues in the social sciences more generally. Of course this may be asking too much, given the existing disciplinary division of labor and the impetus in social epistemology toward cognitive specialization and fragmentation. And an intimate acquaintance with the relevant literature in psychology and philosophy, in this case work on the emotions, can only further and fulfill the ends of any legal theory that endeavors to understand social phenomena as ubiquitous, opaque and often obdurate as social norms.